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The Future of Agricultural Trade Governance in the 
World Trade Organization 
Dr James Scott 
Abstract 
Constructing multilateral rules to govern trade in agricultural goods has been notoriously difficult. 
What success there has been relied on linking liberalization in agriculture to broader deals involving 
multiple sectors through the principle of the single undertaking, but the World Trade Organization’s 
(WTO) Nairobi ministerial conference of 2015 has abandoned that principle, shifting the multilateral 
trade system onto a new trajectory. Using the broad body of political economy theory, this article 
argues that there is now very little prospect that the WTO will be able to liberalize agricultural trade, 
with the consequence that the WTO will be unable to expand the trade opportunities of those 
countries that specialize in producing agricultural commodities. For this reason, the multilateral 
trade system looks increasingly ill-suited to the 1commercial needs of those low-income countries 
that are reliant on exporting agricultural goods and the promise of development through expanding 
trade based on comparative advantage is being tacitly pushed aside. This article argues that the 
abandonment of the single undertaking demands a deep reflection by WTO member states and 
other stakeholders on the underlying principles of the WTO, its future direction and how trade 
opportunities will be created for all within a system that has effectively abandoned further 
liberalization within agriculture. 
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The Future of Agricultural Trade Governance in the 
World Trade Organization 
Dr James Scott1 
 
Introduction 
 
Today’s system of agricultural governance is highly inequitable. Many of the world’s richest 
countries provide steep tariff protection and generous subsidies to their farmers, denying market 
opportunities to agricultural exporters – many of which are developing countries – and depressing 
global prices. Addressing the inadequacies of the current regime was made a key component of the 
World Trade Organization’s (WTO) first full trade round, the Doha Development Agenda (DDA). The 
DDA ultimately failed and disagreement over agriculture lay at the heart of its collapse. Indeed, in 
some regards the difficulties member states face in liberalizing agriculture have stalled the entire 
process of fully multilateral trade governance, as members have abandoned the pursuit of 
agreements that include all states in favour of plurilateral WTO agreements – as will be explored 
below.2  
 
In this article I argue that the new negotiating principles that have been put in place have made the 
task of agreeing a meaningful WTO agreement on agriculture all-but impossible. The history of 
attempts to liberalize agriculture has demonstrated the importance of the ‘single undertaking’ 
principle within multilateral trade negotiations, under which agriculture forms just one area of a 
                                                          
1 King’s College London. Correspondence address: James.m.scott@kcl.ac.uk 
2 Rorden Wilkinson, James Scott and Erin Hannah, ‘The WTO in Nairobi: The Demise of the Doha Development 
Agenda and the Future of the Multilateral Trading System’, Global Policy 7: 2, 2016, pp. 247-255. 
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wider deal covering numerous areas of the economy. Through the single undertaking, domestic 
opposition to liberalization from agricultural groups can be counter-balanced by the export interests 
within other sectors, and this has been essential in securing any deal that aims to liberalize 
agricultural trade. However, at the WTO’s 2015 Nairobi ministerial conference the single 
undertaking was abandoned and, though not officially acknowledged, the prospect of any 
meaningful deal on agriculture went with it. This new reality has profound consequences for the 
future of the multilateral trade system and particularly for the distribution of benefits to be found 
therein. Though some have argued that the single undertaking is overly obstructive and other 
negotiation designs could be used to help facilitate trade agreements, for core sectors such as 
agriculture most suggestions for future negotiating processes continue to rely on a single 
undertaking approach.3 As argued below, with regard specifically to agriculture the single 
undertaking has been an essential element of achieving agreement on subsidy reduction and its 
abandonment makes the prospect of further multilateral disciplines on subsidies significantly more 
remote.  
 
As the WTO moves to plurilateral approaches we are returning to the situation that characterized 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), in which the most powerful states set the 
agenda. Both qualitative and quantitative work has demonstrated how this led to the gains from the 
trade system being channelled primarily to the rich industrial countries, while developing countries – 
and particularly among them those that were reliant on agriculture for export earnings – were left 
behind.4 The DDA was premised on a move away from this tradition, with an explicit endeavour to 
rebalance the historical biases of the GATT/WTO against the interests of developing countries and to 
                                                          
3 See Sonia E. Rolland, ‘Redesigning the Negotiation Process at the WTO’, Journal of International Economic 
Law 13: 1, 2010, pp. 65-110; and Peter Sutherland, The future of the WTO: addressing institutional challenges 
in the new millennium, (Geneva, WTO, 2004). 
4 See, among others, Arvind Subramanian and Shang-Jin Wei, ‘The WTO promotes trade, strongly but not 
evenly’, Journal of International Economics 72: 1, 2007, pp. 151-175; Joanne Gowa and Soo Yeon Kim, ‘An 
exclusive country club: the effects of the GATT on trade, 1950–94’, World Politics 57: 4, 2005, pp. 453-478; 
Rorden Wilkinson, What’s wrong with the WTO and how to fix it (Cambridge: Polity, 2014); Karin Kock, 
International Trade Policy and the GATT 1947-1967 (Stockholm: Almqvist and Wiksell, 1969). 
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strengthen the rules on agriculture in particular. The effective termination of the DDA and the 
abandonment of the single undertaking has signalled an abdication from that endeavour and a 
return to the previous negotiating dynamic, dominated by the most powerful states and excluding 
those areas that they do not find expedient. For those countries that are reliant on agriculture for 
export earnings – and this category includes some of the poorest states – this future looks bleak. 
 
This article analyses the policy processes of trade governance and how domestic political economy 
considerations interact with the negotiating practices and principles within the WTO. It is through 
this interaction that trade opportunities are negotiated and cemented into international law. We 
cannot reliably quantify the lost trade revenues that the changes made to the WTO’s principles of 
negotiation will bring about, but we can understand how they will shape the future direction of the 
institution and how this will structure where commercial opportunities are created.  
 
The article unfolds as follows. The governance of agriculture, perhaps more than any other area of 
trade policy, can only be understood both historically and with a grasp of the political economy of 
trade. For this reason, following this introduction section two examines the political economy 
constraints on liberalization. Section three explores the historical process that delivered the current 
situation, through the GATT, the Uruguay round and the DDA negotiations, and traces the 
importance of the single undertaking. The fourth section examines some reform proposals that have 
been put forward, before the penultimate section draws implications from the preceding analysis for 
the future direction of the WTO. The final section concludes. 
 
  
 
5 
The Political Economy of agriculture 
Agriculture has always been at the heart of political economy as a discipline, particularly concerning 
the appropriate role of states and markets.5 Orthodox economics points to the benefits of greater 
liberalization of agricultural trade. Tariffs on agricultural goods are almost universally higher than on 
manufactured goods, while rich countries – and increasingly emerging economics – employ complex 
subsidies distributing billions of dollars to farmers (or, as explored below, to landowners). As a 
result, agriculture is the most distorted sector of the global economy. Estimates of the benefits of 
moving to free trade made using computable general/partial equilibrium models suggest that 
around 63 per cent of total gains would arise from liberalizing agriculture.6 These estimates come 
with immense caveats and the predictions concerning the economic gains to be had from 
liberalization cannot be taken literally,7 but such models nonetheless give an indication of the 
relative ‘efficiency gains’ to be had within each sector.8 
 
However, for all the economic gains that are promised, protectionism remains the norm. 
Understanding why this is the case has been a perennial question of political economy since at least 
the time of Adam Smith.9 Numerous approaches have evolved, all of which give insights into why it 
has proven to be so difficult to treat agriculture in the same way as other sectors of the economy. 
Here, I briefly set out five.  
 
First, the economic benefits that liberalization brings are dispersed while the costs are concentrated. 
For present purposes, within the industrialized states the benefits would accrue primarily to 
                                                          
5 Anne Orford, ‘Food Security, Free Trade and the Battle for the State’, Journal of International Law and 
International Relations 11: 2, 2015, pp. 1-67. 
6 Kim Anderson and Will Martin, ‘Agricultural Trade Reform and the Doha Development Agenda’, The World 
Economy 28: 9, 2005, p. 1312. 
7 See among others, Clive George, ‘Numbers’, in Erin Hannah, James Scott and Silke Trommer, eds., Expert 
Knowledge in Global Trade (Abingdon and New York: Routledge, 2016). 
8 Though it should be noted that such Smithian efficiencies are only one consideration within trade policy 
making. See George, ‘Numbers’. 
9 For an overview, see Helen V. Milner, ‘The political economy of international trade’, Annual Review of 
Political Science 2: 1, 1999, pp. 91-114. 
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consumers through lowering the costs of the food they consume and reducing the fiscal burden. The 
costs would be borne by the small number of people engaged in farming in those countries facing 
greater import competition, giving them an incentive to push for protection. Furthermore, typically 
around 80 per cent of subsidies go to just 20 per cent of farmers, concentrating the costs of subsidy 
reform even further. 
 
Second, various pressure group models have been developed to bring insight to understanding 
which domestic factions support and which oppose trade liberalization. These focus either on factors 
of production (typically labour and capital) such as in the Stolper-Samuelson model, or on importers 
and exporters as developed in the Ricardo-Viner approach. The latter sets out why the movement 
towards free trade is expected to diminish profits within import competing industries and lead to 
their contraction, thus generating political pressures from those within these sectors to continue 
protection. In those countries that are not globally competitive in agriculture, which includes some 
of the most influential WTO members, powerful and well organized lobby groups have formed to 
ensure that their interests are not ignored by politicians.  
 
Third, agricultural protection forms a core part of the ‘embeddedness’ of the embedded-liberal 
compromise that John Ruggie identified as characterising the trade system.10 The post-war trade 
regime was liberal up to a point, but contained substantial room for government intervention in the 
economy in support of social objectives. One such objective was the desire to protect small scale 
farmers and rural communities. Robert Wolfe interprets this through the concept of the Polanyian 
‘double movement’.11 The GATT, in this view, reflected a ‘compromise between the expansion of the 
global market and a predictable social response to that expansion ... [and] was a compromise 
                                                          
10 John Gerard Ruggie, ‘International regimes, transactions, and change: embedded liberalism in the postwar 
economic order’, International organization 36: 2, 1982, pp. 379-415. 
11 Robert Wolfe, Farm Wars: The Political Economy of Agriculture and the International Trade Regime 
(Basingstoke: MacMillan, 1998); see also Karl Polanyi, The great transformation: The political and economic 
origins of our time (Beacon Press, 1944). 
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between the need to end the managed trade of the 1930s and the equal imperative of preserving 
the social innovation of the New Deal’.12 Protection of marginalized rural economies formed part of 
the compromise necessary to make post-war liberalization socially sustainable.  
  
Fourth, agriculture is sometimes claimed to be different from other sectors and to deserve special 
treatment. This idea, pushed particularly by the EU, can be found in the concept of 
‘multifunctionality’ – defined by the WTO as the idea that ‘agriculture has many functions in addition 
to producing food and fibre, e.g. environmental protection, landscape preservation, rural 
employment … etc’.13 Multifunctionality has been controversial as it has frequently been argued to 
be little more than an excuse for protectionist countries to avoid tackling trade distortions, an 
argument made both by the US and many developing countries.14 Whether or not the concept of 
multifunctionality holds water, there is broad support among the populations of rich countries in 
favour of trade protection in this area.15 The concept of multifunctionality reflects some deeply held 
social and cultural aspects of agriculture. Rice in Japan, for instance, is not merely the staple grain 
but suffuses Japanese culture. The effort and social cooperation required for growing rice in paddy 
fields has been identified as forming the basis for Japanese norms of cooperative organization.16 A 
similar cultural importance is attached to dairy farming in Switzerland. Within Western Europe, 
attitudes to the agricultural sector have been partly shaped by the experience of World War II and 
its associated deprivations. Many other similar examples can be found from around the world. Food 
and its production have a cultural significance that is different to other areas of the economy. 
                                                          
12 Wolfe, Farm Wars, p. 40-41, italics his. 
13 WTO, ‘Glossary: multifunctionality’, available from 
www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/glossary_e/glossary_e.htm, 2016, [accessed 30th June 2016]. 
14 Mary Bohman, Joseph Cooper, Daniel Mullarkey, Mary Anne Normile, David Skully, Stephen Vogel and Edwin 
Young, ‘The use and abuse of multifunctionality’, (Economic Research Service, USDA, 1999); for a somewhat 
contending perspective see Clive Potter and Jonathan Burney, ‘Agricultural multifunctionality in the WTO—
legitimate non-trade concern or disguised protectionism?’, Journal of Rural Studies 18: 1, 2002, pp. 35-47. 
15 Andreas Brandenberg, ‘Animal Welfare Social Preferences for Benefits from a Multifunctional Agriculture in 
Switzerland’, in OECD (ed.) Policy Responses to Societal Concerns in Food and Agriculture: Proceedings of an 
OECD Workshop, (Paris: OECD, 2010). 
16 Michael Ashkenazi and Jeanne Jacob, The Essence of Japanese Cuisine: An Essay on Food and Culture 
(Richmond, Curson, 2000), p. 38.  
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More recently, developing countries have reinvigorated the idea of agriculture warranting special 
treatment through the rise of concerns about food security, though as Matias Margulis has argued 
such concerns have been a recurrent element of the trade system.17 After the onset of the global 
food price crisis in 2007, the associated higher prices for staple crops and the wave of protests to 
which this gave rise, some developing countries have pushed for changes within the WTO to ensure 
that they are able to pursue policies that protect marginalized communities.18 The G33, which has 
championed this issue, has suggested excluding from subsidy limits ‘policies and services related to 
farmer settlement, land reform programmes, rural development and rural livelihood security in 
developing country Members’.19 This issue came to the fore in the WTO in recent years, particularly 
at the Bali Ministerial Conference (to which we return below).  
 
Finally, it is important to note when considering the political economy of agriculture that developing 
countries may share some of the factors examined above but also tend to face unique problems. 
Though urbanization and large scale poverty reduction in East Asia is changing the distribution of 
poverty, it remains the case that over 70 per cent of extreme poverty is found in rural areas.20 These 
people are overwhelmingly small-holder subsistence farmers, though the very poorest – the 
chronically poor – tend to lack access to enough land for subsistence and have to supplement their 
income through other means.21 Extreme poverty leads to malnourishment, with all the ensuing long-
term problems – a permanent reduction in cognitive ability and consequent diminished 
accumulation of human capital, affecting long-term growth rates. Around 70 per cent of total global 
                                                          
17 Matias E. Margulis,.’The Forgotten History of Food Security in Multilateral Trade Negotiations’, World Trade 
Review 16: 1, (2017), pp. 25-57. 
18 Jennifer Clapp and Marc J. Cohen, (eds.). The global food crisis: Governance challenges and opportunities 
(Waterloo, Canada: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2009); Noah Zerbe, ‘Setting the Global Dinner Table: 
Exploring the Limits of the Marketization of Food’, in Jennifer Clapp and Marc J Cohen (eds.) The Global Food 
Crisis, pp. 161-175. 
19 WTO, ‘G33 Proposal on Some Elements of TN/AG/W/4/Rev.4 for Early Agreement to Address Food Security 
Issues’, JOB/AG/22, 13 November 2012.  
20 International Fund for Agricultural Development, Rural Poverty Report (Rome: IFAD, 2011), p. 47. 
21 Chronic Poverty Research Centre, Chronic Poverty Report 2008-2009, (Manchester: CPRC, 2010), p. 60. 
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food production takes place on small-scale farms, making their viability of fundamental importance 
to both tackling poverty and ensuring food security.22 Such considerations make the agricultural 
sector a highly sensitive area for the developing world. 
 
Other political economy considerations could be added to the above, but this overview helps to 
understand why agriculture has been so difficult to bring under the same kind of market regulation 
as other sectors. Each country faces a different mix of factors but almost all have political difficulties 
with liberalization, making the negotiation of international trade rules in agriculture highly contested 
and constrained. However, there is an anomaly that has to be accounted for – the Uruguay round of 
GATT negotiations – in which a deal (albeit a flawed one) tackling agricultural protection was agreed. 
The following section examines agriculture within the multilateral trade system and highlights the 
importance of the single undertaking in enabling the Uruguay round outcome. 
 
Agricultural governance 
 
Agriculture has been treated very differently within the trade system since the present regime was 
inaugurated with the signing of the GATT in 1947.23 The principles that the US – the chief architect of 
that regime – brought to the creation of the post-war trade system were applied only to those areas 
in which the most powerful, industrialized states held a comparative advantage. Central elements of 
that system, such as the ban on quantitative restrictions (GATT Article XI.2c) were explicitly not 
applied to agricultural goods, to ensure that the system did not adversely affect US policies.24 As 
                                                          
22 Orford, ‘Food security’, p. 10. 
23 Jennifer Clapp, ‘Food Security and Contested Agricultural Trade Norms’, Journal of International Law and 
International Relations 11: 2, 2015, pp. 104-115. 
24 William A Brown Jr, The United States and the Restoration of World Trade: An Analysis and Appraisal of the 
ITO Charter and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institute, 1950), 
p. 15. 
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Gilbert Winham cogently summarizes: ‘the original GATT articles on agriculture were in large 
measure written to be consistent with US farm support legislation existing in 1947’.25  
 
That said, agriculture was not explicitly excluded from the GATT (other than over quantitative 
restrictions as noted above – the only GATT article that mentioned agriculture explicitly), but it soon 
became clear that it would not be treated equally. The GATT almost failed at the first hurdle when 
negotiations over the first round of tariff cuts nearly collapsed over the issue of wool, with key 
exporters, led by Australia, demanding more market access into the US, while the US Congress was 
seeking to raise duties further.26 That conflict was eventually resolved (largely in favour of Australia) 
facilitating the creation of the GATT, but it was not long before the issue reared up again. In 1950 
Congress imposed new, severe quotas on dairy products, indicating that it had little intention of 
being bound by the liberal spirit of the GATT in the area of agriculture. The following year Congress 
passed the Trade Agreements Extension Act, stipulating that no trade or other international 
agreement entered into by the US could be applied in a manner inconsistent with the requirements 
of section 22 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act (which required the administration to impose 
quantitative restrictions if imports threatened to impinge upon the effectiveness of a farm 
programme).27 These policies were declared illegal by the GATT dispute settlement body in 1952, 
prompting threats by the US to leave the Agreement. In 1955 to resolve the problem the US sought 
and was granted a waiver from certain GATT obligations ‘to the extent necessary to prevent a 
conflict with such provisions of the General Agreement in the case of action required to be taken by 
the Government of the United States under Section 22’.28 Unlike most waivers this had no time limit, 
                                                          
25 Gilbert Winham, International Trade and the Tokyo Round Negotiation Princeton, (New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press, 1986), p. 152; see also Brown, The United States pp. 15-28. 
26 Ann Capling, ‘The “Enfant Terrible”: Australia and the Reconstruction of the Multilateral Trade system, 
1946–8." Australian economic history review 40: 1, 2000: 1-21. 
27 Winham, International Trade, p. 152. 
28 GATT, ‘United States Request for Waiver in Connection with Section 22 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act’, 
L/315, 28 January, 1955. 
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providing an open-ended exclusion of US GATT-inconsistent agricultural policy from action under 
GATT law. It effectively removed trade in agriculture from the governance of the GATT.  
 
The unique position of agriculture was further cemented with the formation of the Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP) of the EEC in the 1950s-60s, aimed primarily at ensuring a fair standard of 
living for its agricultural community.29 Agricultural exporters raised fears about the CAP in numerous 
discussions within the GATT, voicing concerns that ‘the Community had concocted about as 
watertight a system of protection as could be devised’.30 However, the US waiver made opposition 
to the CAP within the GATT difficult as the principle had been established that normal GATT law 
would not apply to the agricultural sector.  
 
Once the CAP was in place the two dominant contracting parties of the GATT, the US and EEC, which 
together were largely able to control the agenda, both had an interest in maintaining the exclusion 
of agriculture. This situation continued largely unchanged until the final GATT round of negotiations, 
the Uruguay Round. As is well recognized, however, the Agreement was severely flawed. Even WTO 
Director General Mike Moore, whose position within the WTO mandated political neutrality, stated 
that the developing countries had been ‘fobbed off’ by it.31 The Agreement on Agriculture required 
the industrialized countries to convert all trade barriers to tariffs before applying stipulated tariff 
cuts, but the modalities used for this process enabled them to limit the amount of liberalization 
brought about. Indeed, in some cases levels of protection were increased. Analysis of the process 
found that the industrialized countries engaged in significant ‘dirty tariffication’, through which tariff 
rates posted were significantly higher than those dictated by the agreed conversion process. 
                                                          
29 For details, see Alan Swinbank and Carolyn Tanner. Farm policy and trade conflict: the Uruguay Round and 
CAP reform (Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 1996), pp. 33-62. 
30 Gardner Patterson, (1966), Discrimination in International Trade: The Policy Issues 1945-1965 (Princeton, 
Princeton University Press, 1966), p. 203.  
31 WTO, ‘WTO negotiations: agriculture and developing countries’, Speech Paris, 6 December, 2000, available 
from http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/spmm_e/spmm47_e.htm. 
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Calculations found that the announced tariff equivalent rates exceeded the actual equivalent tariff 
rates by a proportion of 61 per cent for the EU and 44 per cent for the US.32  
 
A similar problem arose concerning subsidies. The baseline year for calculating the level of subsidies 
gave both the US and EU considerable slack in the required cuts due to reforms and price changes 
after the baseline period of 1986-88.33 As a consequence, industrialized country support to their 
agricultural sectors subsequently increased from 31 per cent of gross farm receipts in 1997 to 40 per 
cent in 1999 without violating the Agreement on Agriculture.34 Since then, the 2002 US Farm Bill 
brought into effect an 80 per cent increase in subsidies to its farmers but was still in compliance with 
the letter, if not the spirit, of the agreement.35 The Agreement on Agriculture placed weak 
restrictions on the type of subsidies that could be used, but no upper limit was placed on subsidies 
that were not considered to be overly trade distorting, such as insurance schemes, payments for 
environmental and regional assistance programmes and payments encouraging the restructuring of 
agricultural production. These flexibilities were the price of getting an agreement. The main aim of 
the negotiators was to tackle the problem of over-production that had arisen from the subsidization 
of production, and the only politically acceptable solution was to move to subsidies that encouraged 
farmers to produce less.36 Despite the Uruguay Round taking eight years to negotiate and 
temporarily collapsing at the ministerial conference in 1990 when the food exporting nations, led by 
Brazil, refused the deal on offer because of the weakness of the agricultural component, the final 
agreement had only a limited impact on previous policies.37 
 
                                                          
32 Arvind Panagariya, ‘Developing Countries at Doha: A Political Economy Analysis’, The World Economy 25: 9, 
2002 p. 1219. 
33 Jarrod Wiener, Making Rules in the Uruguay Round of the GATT (Aldershot: Dartmouth Publishing Company, 
1995), p. 174. 
34 OECD, Agricultural Policies in OECD Countries: Monitoring and Evaluation 2000, (Paris: OECD, 2000). 
35 Watkins, Kevin Watkins. ‘Greed in Action’, The Guardian, 5 June, 2002. 
36 Wolfe, Farm Wars.  
37 Matias E. Margulis, ‘The Forgotten History of Food Security in Multilateral Trade Negotiations’, World Trade 
Review 16: 1, 2017, pp. 17-27. 
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Despite the weakness of the agreement on agriculture and the very limited reforms it required, it 
was only achievable because it was part of the whole package of agreements that formed the 
Uruguay Round. Signatories could not cherry pick only the parts they liked but had to accept the 
whole package through what was termed the ‘single undertaking’ – the principle that nothing was 
agreed until everything was agreed. In this way, domestic groups that stood to lose from elements of 
the package (such as agricultural producers in importing countries) could be outweighed by those 
standing to gain (such as producers of intellectual property, services and high technology 
manufactures). The single undertaking was crucial in enabling signatories to clear the Uruguay 
Round through their domestic legislative processes, particularly with regard to agriculture. As Robert 
Wolfe has argued, ‘balance within agriculture … could not be achieved for all participants, but the 
tight linkage to other areas of commercial policy through the Single Undertaking facilitated 
agreement… [I]mport-sensitive participants [such] as the EC, Japan, Korea and Switzerland would 
not likely have accepted agricultural liberalisation outside the Single Undertaking’.38 Even then, it is 
likely that the single undertaking mechanism would not in itself have been enough to secure final 
agreement. The creation of a new institution  – the WTO – and the institutional regeneration that 
came with it was crucial in securing support for the final package, which may make the 
comprehensive agreement of the Uruguay Round a one-off.39 
 
Two points emerge from this section. First, the Agreement on Agriculture – which remains the only 
multilateral trade agreement on agriculture – was supposed to begin the process of liberalization of 
the sector but was limited in effectiveness and demanded very little real policy change. Second, even 
this was only possible through the creation of the single undertaking as a new principle for the trade 
                                                          
38 Robert Wolfe. ‘The WTO Single Undertaking as Negotiating Technique and Constitutive Metaphor’, Journal 
of International Economic Law 22: 4, 2008, p. 841. 
39 Rorden Wilkinson, Transforming Our World by 2030: The Multilateral Trading System and the New Agenda 
for Sustainable Development, International Trade Working Paper 2015/02, (London: Commonwealth 
Secretariat, 2015). 
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system. The next section demonstrates how the next round of negotiations, the DDA, followed a 
similar pattern. 
 
The Doha Development Agenda 
The inadequacies of the Agreement on Agriculture were clear even at the time it was concluded and 
it consequently included the stipulation that the negotiations would continue after a hiatus of five 
years. However, when the time came for negotiations to begin the EU and others made it clear that 
they could not offer further liberalization of agriculture without it being part of a wider package of 
deals. That is, they needed agriculture to form part of another single undertaking such that the 
her reforms could once again be balanced against those groups opposing furt-domestic lobby
standing to gain in other areas.40 This was among the factors that led to the launching in 2001 of the 
.DDAs first round of trade negotiations, the ’WTO  
 
The Doha Ministerial Declaration, which set out the work programme for the round, reconfirmed 
members’ commitment to establishing ‘a fair and market-oriented trading system’.41 The tensions 
between those members seeking to continue protection in agriculture and those demanding 
liberalization were reflected in the tortured compromise language concerning the specific aims of 
the negotiations. Members committed themselves to ‘comprehensive negotiations aimed at: 
substantial improvements in market access; reductions of, with a view to phasing out, all forms of 
export subsidies; and substantial reductions in trade-distorting domestic support’, but these aims 
were prefaced with the phrase ‘without prejudging the outcome of the negotiations’, explicitly 
acknowledging the possibility of nothing being achieved.42 As the negotiations began, developing 
                                                          
40 European Commission, ‘Statement by M.P. Carl, Director-General of DG Trade on behalf of the European 
Communities at the TNC’, 18 July, 2002, available from 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2004/november/tradoc_120119.pdf. 
41 WTO, ‘Doha WTO Ministerial 2001: Ministerial Declaration’, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 20 November 2001, 
paragraph 13. 
42 WTO, ‘Doha WTO Ministerial 2001, paragraph 13. See also J. Michael Finger, ‘The Doha Agenda and 
Development: A View from the Uruguay Round’, ERD Working Paper Series, No. 21, 2002, pp. 16-17. 
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countries saw the DDA as an opportunity to strengthen multilateral oversight of agricultural trade, 
particularly through bringing about significant reductions in subsidies. However, many also 
emphasized the need to protect rural livelihoods and ensure food security.43  
 
Almost from the start of the DDA negotiations it was clear that agriculture would be a central 
sticking point. In February 2003 the Chair of the agriculture negotiations, Stuart Harbinson, 
presented a text with proposals on all three main pillars – market access, export subsidies and 
domestic support.44 The text was criticized from many sides. The EU argued that it went too far on 
export subsidies. The US argued that it was not ambitious enough on market access but also made it 
clear that the US would not be willing to undertake the demanded changes on domestic support. 
Following rejection of the Harbinson text by almost all parties, the EU and US undertook to produce 
a new proposal. This was published in August 2003 ahead of the Cancún Ministerial Conference, but 
was not well received by the remaining WTO membership including the Africa Group, India, Brazil, 
China and the developing countries of the Cairns Group of agricultural exporters.45 Some details of 
why members opposed the proposal are useful for understanding the way in which agriculture is 
treated in the WTO system and the difficulties of achieving an agreement.  
 
Reforms of the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy had decoupled large parts of EU domestic support 
from production, greatly reducing the level of subsidies that counted towards their Aggregate 
                                                          
43 See, among others, WTO, ‘Southern African Development Community: Statement Circulated by the 
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Measure of Support (AMS).46 Consequently the EU could propose 55-60 per cent reductions in AMS 
and around 50 per cent in the Blue Box47 without this affecting existing support programmes. The 
United States had also introduced reforms to decouple subsidies from production but US total 
support remained much closer to its bound AMS compared to that of the EU. Any significant 
reduction would therefore oblige the US to undertake reform of its subsidy programmes, which it 
was not willing to do.48 In order to accommodate the needs of the US, the joint proposal expanded 
the Blue Box to enable the US to reclassify important elements of its subsidy regime, particularly its 
counter-cyclical payments, as Blue Box (less trade distorting) subsidies and remove them from the 
AMS.  
  
The joint proposal was quickly recognized by the developing countries as being an attempt to evade 
any meaningful liberalization and their resistance to it led to the collapse of the Cancún Ministerial 
Conference.49 Over the following years, renewed efforts were made to come to a more acceptable 
solution among various groups of core WTO members. The text that was eventually on the table  
when the DDA negotiations finally entered a period of stasis had been thoroughly reworked, yet in 
key regards it continued to reflect the unwillingness of the rich countries to limit subsidies.50 The US 
managed to maintain the reclassification of counter-cyclical payments, while the domestic support 
cuts required by the final draft text entailed no reductions to existing agricultural programmes in 
either the US or the EU, but would have simply cut out the ‘water’ between the bound rate and the 
applied rate of subsidies.  While there may be value in concluding a deal that locks subsidies at their 
                                                          
46 The Aggregate Measure of support refers to the total level of subsidies that are considered to be trade 
distorting.  
47 The Blue Box contains subsidies that would otherwise be in considered trade distorting and therefore be 
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48 Rajesh Aggarwal, ‘Dynamics of Agriculture Negotiations in the World Trade Organization’, Journal of World 
Trade 39: 4, 2005, pp. 741-761. 
49 Amrita Narlikar and Rorden Wilkinson, ‘Collapse at the WTO: a Cancún post‐mortem’, Third World Quarterly 
25: 3, 2004, 447-460. 
50 WTO, ‘Revised Draft Modalities for Agriculture’, TN/A/W/4/Rev.4, 6 December, 2008. 
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current levels,51 the overall lesson from the DDA was the impossibility of negotiating a reduction in 
farm support in rich countries, even when this was going to be counterbalanced by significantly 
more ambitious liberalization of industrial goods.52  
 
The failure of other avenues to bring about change reinforces this lesson. Moral shaming, 
particularly over the effect of cotton subsidies, failed to achieve any movement in tackling 
subsidies.53 Even the Dispute Settlement Mechanism has been shown to be unable to enforce 
current rules consistently in this area. For example, following its ruling that the US cotton subsidy 
regime was illegal the US opted to pay annual compensation to Brazil rather than change its policies 
– a situation that will continue through to at least 2018 since the latest US farm bill (covering 2014-
2018) continues WTO-inconsistent cotton subsidies54 – demonstrating that the chief architect of the 
international trade system is unwilling to abide by WTO rules. These disconnects between principle 
and practice have led to treatment of agriculture within the WTO being characterized as ‘organized 
hypocrisy’.55 
 
Reinforcing the difficulty of bringing about a more liberal trade regime in agriculture is the fact that 
the emerging powers are increasingly introducing their own subsidy schemes. While most 
developing countries continue to lack the financial resources to subsidize their farmers, those that 
have enjoyed sustained economic growth are increasingly turning toward agricultural support, 
leading to a degree of convergence in such practices among the small group of the most powerful 
member states of the WTO. The most prominent emerging powers – Brazil, India and China – have 
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been joined by others, including Indonesia, Nigeria and Turkey, in increasing domestic support for 
farmers.56 This trend is beginning to create new tensions, most notably surfacing at the Bali 
Ministerial Conference of 2013.57 Responding to the sharply increased and more volatile food prices 
seen since 2007, India introduced the National Food Security Bill, or ‘Right to Food Act’ in September 
2013, through which staple foodstuffs are purchased at guaranteed prices from small-holder farmers 
to be sold subsequently at low prices to those below the poverty line. The Agreement on Agriculture 
had made provisions for such public stockholding schemes, but the details had subsequently proven 
to be highly restrictive. Where they included minimum prices public stockholding schemes were 
considered to constitute subsidies, with the value of the subsidy calculated as the difference 
between that price and a reference price set at prevailing world prices between 1986 and 1988. 
Following the 2007 increase in global food prices that reference price was far below prevailing 
market prices, making the calculated subsidy level rise. Since developing countries generally had 
minimal subsidy schemes at the time of the Uruguay round’s conclusion, their bound subsidy rate 
was set at zero, which made India’s Food Security Bill exceed its AMS binding.  
 
India’s Food Security Bill reflects broader concerns with achieving food security that have come to 
the fore in the wake of the food price rises seen in 2007-8. As major civil unrest unfolded in 
numerous countries – Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Egypt, Guinea, Haiti, Indonesia, Mauritania, 
Mexico, Morocco, Nepal, Peru, Senegal and Uzbekistan among others58 – in protest at the changes in 
food affordability, the need for governments to pay far greater attention to food commodities and 
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their affordability has been recognized, most notably by the commissioning by the UN of a report by 
a High Level Panel of Experts.59 As Noah Zerbe puts it: 
 
Perhaps food is unique among commodities in that it is fundamentally necessary for 
human experience. In this respect, any solution to the current crisis should begin with 
the premise that food should not be subject merely to regulation of the market; that 
food security should be a central goal of state policy.60 
 
Two schools of thought have arisen in response to the problems currently being seen in agricultural 
markets. For the WTO, World Bank and others, market liberalization should play the key role in 
improving food security.61 Liberalization will shift production to the most efficient areas, bringing 
prices down in the mid term, which, other things being equal, increases the affordability of food. 
Furthermore, trade liberalization is expected by adherents to this view to bring about higher growth 
and thereby higher incomes, enabling people to increase food consumption. As former DG Pascal 
Lamy put it: ‘The reduction of trade barriers in agriculture, enhanced market access for agricultural 
products and the gradual decrease in subsidies provided by rich countries to their farmers … all 
contribute to the same objective: the implementation of the right to food for all’.62  
 
However, the ability of liberalization to improve matters will necessarily have its limits. Amartya Sen 
famously demonstrated that the ability of people to access food depends as much on their set of 
                                                          
59 High Level Panel of Experts. Price volatility and food security. A report by the High Level Panel of Experts on 
Food Security and Nutrition of the Committee on World Food Security (Rome: UN, 2011). 
60 Zerbe, ‘Setting the Global Dinner Table’, p. 72. 
61 See for example World Bank, World Development Report (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2008). For analysis, 
see Matias E. Margulis, ‘Trading Out of the Global Food Crisis? The World Trade Organization and the 
Geopolitics of Food Security’, Geopolitics 19: 2, 2014, pp. 322-350. 
62 WTO, ‘Towards Shared Responsibility and Greater Coherence: Human Rights, Trade and Macroeconomic 
Policy’, speech to the Colloquium on Human Rights in the Global Economy, Geneva, 13 Jan. 2010, available 
from www.wto.org/english/news_e/sppl_e/sppl146_e.htm. 
  
 
20 
entitlements as it does on the availability of food in markets.63 Sen’s thinking has had a deep 
influence on the smorgasbord of UN agencies, which present an alternative view concerning the 
direction of global food governance based on rights and entitlements.64 Defending and advancing 
this concept is most clearly articulated through the pronouncements of the former UN Special 
Rapporteur on the Right to Food, Olivier De Schutter, who argued that global trade rules must be 
secondary to what he calls the ‘global consensus on hunger’.65 He explicitly rejects an over-reliance 
on market mechanisms, arguing that ‘it would be naïve to think that simply promoting more trade 
liberalization will be a solution. What is needed is a balanced trade agreement that puts the needs of 
the hungry at its centre. The poor need appropriate regulation and protection as much as they need 
trade’.66 For some countries, particularly those that are less competitive in agriculture, the approach 
advocated by de Schutter is appealing, while more competitive members align behind giving a 
greater role to liberalization. 
 
These differences in outlook contributed to the difficulties faced within the DDA, which was finally 
laid to rest at the Nairobi Ministerial Conference of 2015. Simultaneously, as noted above, the WTO 
members abandoned the principle of the single undertaking, ignoring the dissent of a number of 
developing countries led by India.67 Currently discussions are taking place about how future 
negotiations will be organized in new areas, but with regard to agriculture the implications seem 
clear. As argued above, the single undertaking has been the crucial governance mechanism 
employed to overcome the political economy constraints to submitting agriculture to the market. Its 
abandonment makes the hitherto difficult task of achieving multilaterally agreed restrictions on 
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agricultural distortions all but impossible. The insights of numerous political economy approaches, 
and the empirical history of post-World War II trade governance strongly suggest that a standalone 
agreement on agricultural liberalization would be all but impossible to clear through the domestic 
legislative processes of a significant number of member states. The so-called mega-regionals offer 
scant likelihood of movement on subsidies. The most comprehensive such agreement, the Trans-
Pacific Partnership, included no provisions to tackle domestic agricultural subsidies.68 The traditional 
WTO approach in which numerous sectors were linked together in a trade round, all agreed on the 
basis of the single undertaking and providing benefits to all participants through the principle of 
diffuse reciprocity, has been abandoned, opening up the agenda to new issues but also surely 
putting the nail in the coffin of attempts to submit agriculture to market disciplines.  
 
The picture that emerges is that there has been a sporadic effort by a subset of agricultural 
exporters to liberalize agricultural trade throughout the period of the GATT and WTO but this effort 
has consistently been blocked.69 Repeated attempts to bring agriculture from the ‘embedded’ side 
into the ‘liberal’ wing have been thwarted by those countries concerned about protecting inefficient 
agricultural producers. In the post-WWII era there has never been a successful attempt to liberalize 
agricultural trade – the Agreement on Agriculture did almost nothing to reduce protection – and the 
constant tensions within the DDA and its final demise over the issue of the SSM demonstrates the 
continued reluctance to pursue this agenda. At best, the DDA texts offered modest change, shifting 
subsidies around rather than reducing them and having only a limited impact on tariff peaks, and 
even this modest change has been strongly resisted by numerous groups. The G10 group of 
countries most defensive on agriculture continue to push the ‘multifunctionality’ of agriculture and 
the need to protect the rural economy.70 The ‘martyrdom’ (as some NGOs like to put it) of Lee Kyung 
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Hae – the South Korean farmer who committed suicide in 2003 in protest at the reforms of 
agriculture included in the DDA – continues to be a rallying cry for NGOs opposed to the direction of 
the negotiations and illustrates the political difficulties member states will have in pursuing deep 
agricultural liberalization. Such considerations highlight the continued need for reform, and there 
has been no shortage of proposals put forward. The next section turns to these and explores the 
implications of the preceding analysis for the future direction of the WTO. 
 
Future directions 
 
Before turning to reform proposals it is worth noting that while the deadlock within the WTO affects 
the future possibility of negotiations concerning all core sectors, failure to reform the rules on 
agriculture is more concerning than other areas. This is for two key reasons. 
 
First, the existing baseline within agriculture is much more distortionary than other sectors. This is 
the result not only of subsidies, as set out above, but also other sources of distortion, such as 
increasing market concentration among a few powerful companies in important parts of the 
production chain, which has contributed to price inflation and thereby hunger.71 In addition, tariffs 
are significantly higher in agriculture than in other sectors. If there is no forthcoming multilateral 
agreement on non-agricultural market access, a status quo will be maintained in which the major 
economies have locked in place relatively low bound tariff rates for industrial goods, but those 
within agriculture are significantly higher. Furthermore, such simple averages hide sometimes 
immense tariff peaks. China, the EU and Japan all have tariffs of above 25 per cent on approximately 
one tenth of their agricultural tariff lines. Some specific products face huge peaks on bound tariff 
rates – 800 per cent on rice in Japan’s schedules, 314 per cent on Canadian dairy products and 600 
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per cent on isoglucose imports into the EU, for instance. All too often it is developing countries that 
lose market opportunities as a result of these distortions. 
 
Second, other WTO agreements at times provide weaker remedies than they do for non-agricultural 
goods. One example is the Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM) agreement. In theory, the 
price depressing effect of agricultural subsidies could be counteracted by countervailing duties 
imposed via the SCM. However, while this can play a role, in some important cases it is not possible. 
To take one example, the West African cotton exporting countries – known as the Cotton Four –  
that have been prominent in demanding disciplines on cotton subsidies paid by the rich countries 
(particularly the US) have no recourse to the SCM to remedy their trade losses, since they are 
interested in exporting, not importing, cotton. The countries importing cotton for use in 
manufacturing industries have little incentive to impose countervailing duties on subsidized US 
cotton exports since their industrial sectors benefit from cheaper priced inputs. Consequently, West 
African exporters have no means of attenuating their losses within existing WTO agreements. This 
dynamic is also at work in some manufacturing sectors, notably steel and pharmaceuticals, where 
there is concern about subsidized production, but the rules on subsidizing manufacturing are 
significantly stronger and the problem is mainly to be found in agricultural trade. 
 
Numerous reforms to agricultural trade governance have been put forward from both within and 
outside the WTO, ranging from small-scale, incremental reform to suggestions for wholly different 
regulatory frameworks. Norway put forward a modest proposal in July 201672 that would cut some 
of the ‘water’ from AMS and reduce non-product specific de minimus support.73 This would demand 
no, or minimal, changes in current policies by the subsidising states and exclude almost all 
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developing countries from reductions – described as a ‘superficial’ approach by South Centre.74 
While such an incremental approach would be politically the most palatable for the rich countries, 
the lack of ambition meant that the proposal received little support from those wanting to see 
greater cuts and the proposal gained little traction.75  
 
At the other end of the spectrum, a far more radical approach to changing the subsidies regime has 
been offered by Clive George, who has argued that rather than seek to limit subsidies a new WTO 
regulatory framework should be put in place on all agricultural exports to impose a mandatory 
export tax equal to the value of any subsidies received.76  This would have the effect of enabling 
countries to use whatever domestic regime they want in pursuit of ensuring their food security, rural 
development and the other components of multifunctionality such as animal welfare and 
environmental standards, but it would insulate other countries from the problem of subsidized 
agricultural goods undermining their own production and competitiveness. States would be free to 
use subsidies to maintain domestic production even when it is not competitive with world prices, 
but only within the domestic market and not, as is currently the case, in third party markets with the 
resulting effects on other countries’ food production. 
 
The export tax required under George’s proposal would be set to counterbalance the extent to 
which the subsidy reduces the price of the goods in question, a similar calculation to that already 
done by the OECD in its yearly analysis of Producer Support Estimates.77 This could be argued to be 
an improvement on current rules since at present the less trade distorting Blue and Green boxes are 
unconstrained, justified on the grounds that they are less trade distorting. However, it is increasingly 
                                                          
74 South Centre, ‘The WTO’s Agriculture Domestic Supports Negotiations’, Analytical note, 2017, 
SC/AN/TDP/2017/1. 
75 WTO, ’WTO members remain divided on how to advance agriculture negotiations’, News item, 22 July 2015.  
76 Clive George, The Truth About Trade (London and New York: Zed Books, 2010), pg 142. 
77 OECD, ‘Producer and Consumer Support Estimates database’, 2016, available from www.oecd.org. 
  
 
25 
recognized that such subsidies still have a trade impact.78 Any policy that provides regular, reliable 
financial support to farmers will affect their attitude to risk and therefore impact on their production 
decisions.  
 
George’s radical redrawing of the entire framework for how the WTO regulates subsidies is not 
something that has entered the WTO debate. Nonetheless, other proposals have moved a small way 
in that direction such as the paper put forward by Brazil, Argentina, Columbia and Paraguay,79 which 
proposed that limits to subsidies might be linked to exports, allowing countries that have no impact 
on world markets a free rein in agricultural policies. However, such proposals have not received the 
support of subsidising countries. Nor is support likely from states wanting access to major consumer 
markets, if domestic producers in those markets are not exporting but are able to compete only 
through subsidy schemes which would be exempt from challenge.    
 
What does this mean for the future direction of WTO negotiations? Crystal ball gazing is a perilous 
and unforgiving enterprise. However, we can use history as a guide for tackling this question, most 
notably the effect within the GATT of a regime in which agriculture was largely excluded. Two fairly 
safe predictions can be made about the future direction of the WTO, both of which have concerning 
implications. First, it is clear that WTO agreements will turn to plurilateral initiatives, based on 
coalitions of the willing. This was the outcome desired by the US and EU in ending the DDA, enabling 
the trade agenda to move on to new issues without the constraints of including all WTO members 
and including all topics under a single undertaking. Far from being an entirely new world, this in fact 
returns to the prevalent mode of operation throughout the period of the GATT, which was more 
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often plurilateral than multilateral.80 Qualitative research has noted that this led to the effective 
exclusion of the interests of the developing world.81 The agenda was set by the advanced 
industrialized countries, tackling issues of particular concern to their own trade and setting in place 
regulatory regimes that privileged their own interests. The result was asymmetric trade rounds that 
created trade opportunities only in areas in which the rich world had a comparative advantage. 
   
Quantitative work has confirmed this analysis. Arvind Subramanian and Shang-Jin Wei have explored 
whether the GATT/WTO increased trade and the distribution of benefits that it created. They find 
that the GATT/WTO regime has significantly increased total trade flows, but these benefits were 
heavily skewed toward the industrialized countries and the increased trade flows were not seen in 
the sectors that were effectively excluded from the GATT (i.e. agriculture and textiles and clothing). 
Subramanian and Wei put these asymmetries down to developing countries opting not to engage in 
liberalization: ‘because developing countries did not engage in tariff negotiations in these sectors, 
developed countries had less incentive to liberalize’.82 While it is undeniably the case that 
developing countries liberalized less within the GATT than developed countries, the considerations 
above suggest that it is mistaken to explain the failure to achieve agricultural liberalization by 
developing countries not engaging sufficiently.83 This view rather ignores the political economy 
constraints that preclude meaningful agricultural liberalization, which cannot be overcome by any 
promises of reciprocity on the part of the developing world. No amount of liberalization by the 
Cotton Four countries will induce the US to change its cotton subsidies, which are tightly bound by 
domestic constraints. Nonetheless, Subramanian and Wei’s work highlights the way the benefits of 
the trade system were skewed towards the industrialized countries while little was gained by the 
less developed, particularly those reliant on agricultural exports.  
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Conclusion 
 
This article has argued that the body of scholarship on trade strongly suggests that securing 
liberalization in the agricultural sector through the WTO will be highly unlikely, particularly on 
subsidies, unless there is a significant and unexpected change in the politics at play. The implications 
of the end of the single undertaking and with it the effective abandonment of any serious attempt to 
bring agriculture more comprehensively within the norms governing trade in industrial products are 
made clear by both the qualitative and quantitative appraisals of the effects of the GATT. The 
exclusion of this sector ensures that the distributional benefits of the trade system will be to the 
detriment of those countries that rely on agricultural products for their export earnings, including 
some of the poorest WTO members. The WTO holds no meaningful prospects for advancing the 
interests of those countries that hold a comparative advantage in agricultural products.  
 
Nonetheless, WTO negotiations will continue and deals in other sectors will be made, giving us the 
prospect of further asymmetric bargains. The single undertaking as a negotiating principle was not 
without problems84 and my intention is not to reify it, but the prospect of the WTO being unable to 
‘level the playing field’ in agriculture ought to bring about deep reflection on the part of WTO 
members and elsewhere on the normative underpinning of the organization. If the WTO cannot 
deliver agricultural liberalization, then it cannot deliver gains for a significant section of its members 
through the traditional means of trade rounds, and some other form of benefit for them must be 
sought. One possible direction could be increasing the role that the WTO plays in development – 
which has been growing substantially despite the tendency to declare that the WTO is not a 
development organization – and giving it a direct mandate to assist developing countries to 
industrialize. This would mean a substantial shift in the normative underpinnings of the organization, 
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shifting it away from the idea of liberal trade being the means by which development is attained 
towards focusing more on the need to actively change areas of comparative advantage.  
 
This is just one suggestion designed to do no more than open a conversation. What is 
unquestionably needed is greater reflection on how the multilateral trade system is to ensure that 
all members have new trade opportunities opened to them, in a system in which the prospect of 
meaningful liberalization in agriculture has had to be all but given up. The legitimacy of the WTO in 
its current form and its goals – namely ‘to improve the welfare of the peoples of the member 
countries’ through progressive liberalization – cannot be sustained if agriculture is effectively no 
longer on the agenda as this renders as fictional the idea that the WTO can bring benefits to all 
members regardless of their areas of comparative advantage. The WTO gains a degree of legitimacy 
through the de jure inclusion of agriculture, holding out the prospects to agricultural producers in 
the developing world of securing their interests through membership and participation. Yet the de 
facto abandonment of that goal makes that legitimacy highly questionable.  
